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ABSTRACT
Against the backdrop of proposals to introduce a European unemployment
insurance scheme, we study public support for such schemes by conducting a
conjoint experiment on support for European unemployment insurance in 13
EU member states. We argue that European-level social policy initiatives and
the underlying notions of solidarity cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional
concept, but rather include various dimensions. Unemployment schemes vary
in their generosity, the conditions for support, their impact on taxation, the
extent to which they preclude permanent redistribution between countries,
and the EU’s role in their administration. Generosity, conditions and taxation
are ‘domestic’ dimensions, since they mainly resonate with domestic policy
debates; between-country redistribution and administration are ‘cross-border’
dimensions, referring to relationships between countries. We expect economic
ideology to interact predominantly with domestic dimensions and EU support
to interact predominantly with cross-border dimensions. Findings conﬁrm
these expectations, with the exception of between-country redistribution and
country-level conditionality.
KEYWORDS European unemployment insurance; European social policy; economic left-right
orientations; support for European integration; solidarity; conjoint analysis
Introduction
In the aftermath of the euro crisis, policy makers started to discuss the creation
of solidarity mechanisms at the European level. The rationale for this is
twofold: ﬁrst, these mechanisms would ease economic adjustment in the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), second, they would ensure social pro-
tection for citizens of crisis-struck countries. Although governments remain
divided, the idea that EMU needs an automatic mechanism of risk sharing
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Theresa Kuhn Theresa.kuhn@uva.nl
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1701529
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY
2020, VOL. 27, NO. 2, 208–226
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1701529
to absorb unemployment shocks has been discussed both in the European
Commission (2017a, 2017b) and the European Council (Van Rompuy 2012).
The euro crisis has also increased the political salience of European inte-
gration, and public opinion has become an increasingly relevant factor in
legitimizing further integration (Hooghe and Marks 2018).
Hence, it is key to understand what European citizens make of these plans
to establish a European unemployment insurance (EUI) and how diﬀerent
design features of risk sharing contribute to support for such policies. This
paper focuses on how individuals’ economic ideology and attitudes towards
European integration aﬀect preferences for alternative proposals for EUI. Exist-
ing research yields mixed results by showing that both economic ideology
(Kleider and Stoeckel 2018) and attitudes towards European integration
(Bechtel et al. 2014; Kleider and Stoeckel 2018; Kuhn et al. 2018) play an impor-
tant role in structuring public support for cross-border solidarity.
We argue that European-level social policy initiatives and the underlying
notions of solidarity cannot be reduced to a single, one-dimensional
concept of what ‘social Europe’ or ‘European solidarity’ entails (Baute
et al. 2018; Gallego and Marx 2017). For instance, EUI includes various
dimensions, such as the generosity and conditionality of the scheme, and
citizen support for EUI likely depends on these dimensions. We expect
that economic ideology and attitudes towards European integration
inﬂuence the impact of the various policy dimensions on policy support
in diﬀerent ways. We show that some dimensions, such as generosity,
are ‘domestic’ dimensions, since they mainly resonate with domestic
policy debates and hence relate more directly to the economic ideology
of respondents, whereas preferences over other dimensions, such as admin-
istration of the scheme, are ‘cross-border’ dimensions, referring to relation-
ships between countries and reﬂect citizens’ orientations towards European
integration. We conducted a conjoint survey experiment involving 19,500
respondents across 13 EU countries. We ask respondents to choose
between randomly assigned pairs of policy packages, varying across six
dimensions: (1) their generosity (the minimum level of beneﬁts secured
by European support); (2) whether there are conditions for participating
countries in terms of providing education and training for the unemployed;
(3) whether the scheme involves permanent between-country redistribu-
tion; (4) the impact of the scheme on taxation in the respondent’s
country; (5) whether the scheme is administered by the EU or by national
governments; (6) whether there are conditions attached for the individual
unemployed. We aim to reﬂect important dimensions of existing policy pro-
posals and to study diﬀerences in political attitudes. We consider generos-
ity, conditions and taxation as predominantly ‘domestic’ dimensions, since
they mainly resonate with well-known domestic policy debates. In contrast,
we consider between-country redistribution and the level of administration
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as ‘cross-border’ dimensions, since they refer to relationships between
countries.
We ﬁnd that only about 3% of the respondents reject all forms of unem-
ployment risk sharing, while about 6% lend unconditional support to all
packages. In general, support for these schemes depends on the design fea-
tures and on attitudes and background characteristics of the respondents.
Supporting our hypotheses, we ﬁnd that the level of administration, which
is a cross-border dimension, has substantially more traction depending on
individual attitudes towards European integration; the results for the other
cross-border dimension, between-country redistribution, point to some
extent in the same direction, but the results are less straightforward. We
ﬁnd that domestic dimensions have substantially more traction depending
on the individual’s economic ideology, except for the conditions that apply
to the education and training programmes which the countries have to
provide. The latter observation may be explained by the fact that the left-
right cleavage does not play out in domestic debates on training and edu-
cation in the way it plays out in domestic debates on, for instance, the gener-
osity of beneﬁts, or by the fact that the distinction between ‘domestic’ and
‘cross-border’ is less clear-cut with regard to this dimension.
Public support for European unemployment risk sharing
The European Commission has argued repeatedly that, next to a Banking
Union and a Capital Market Union, EMU needs automatic ﬁscal stabilizers
(Franchino and Segatti 2019). One option to achieve this would be the re-
insurance of national unemployment beneﬁt schemes at the euro-zone
level (European Commission 2017a, 2017b). The organization of automatic
stabilizers, such as a re-insurance of national unemployment beneﬁts, was
rehearsed in successive oﬃcial EU reports and the subject matter of academic
and policy debates (summarized in Vandenbroucke et al. 2018). The focus on
unemployment insurance is not happenstance. Unemployment insurance
supports purchasing power of citizens in a recession, and it is therefore an
automatic stabilizer par excellence. Historically, unemployment insurance
was a crucial building block in the development of welfare states, and was
often established in moments of major economic crisis (Rehm 2016). It is
therefore unsurprising that the Great Recession has triggered debate about
an EMU-wide support for national unemployment beneﬁt schemes. In
today’s EU, assigning a role to the EU in the realm of unemployment insurance
remains politically an uphill battle. Given the political resistance against EU
cross-border risk sharing, it is important to understand citizens’ attitudes
towards such ideas. Sensitive issues in European debates about risk sharing
concern, among others, the conditions for European support for member
states, the degree to which permanent redistribution might emerge
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between member states, and the impact on taxation. These issues are dealt
with in our research. The emphasis on design questions diﬀerentiates it
from other studies on EU-wide solidarity that test general predispositions to
share resources across borders in various circumstances of need, or relatively
broad policy orientations. Research on general attitudes towards European
solidarity yields mixed results: some studies ﬁnd considerable support for
EU-wide cross-border solidarity (Ferrera and Pellegata 2017; Gerhards et al.
2018), while other studies come to more nuanced conclusions (Lahusen
and Grasso 2018) or ﬁnd that public support depends heavily on the
domain under review (Genschel and Hemerijck 2018).
Research on public support for national unemployment beneﬁts empha-
sizes self-interest, notably, whether individuals can expect to be net beneﬁci-
aries or net contributors, given their employment status (Naumann et al.
2016), risk proﬁle and income level (Rehm 2016), and the role of social
justice perceptions such as egalitarianism and the ‘deservingness’ of the
unemployed (Van Oorschot et al. 2017). We combine these social justice con-
siderations in a scale that measures respondents’ left-right position, and
control for whether they are currently employed.
In the context of the evolving ideological realignment experienced by
western societies (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Teney et al. 2014), we examine
how the speciﬁc design of EUI aﬀects public support, and how this impact
varies across people’s economic left-right preferences and their orientations
towards European integration. On the one hand, the ‘old’ ideological cleavage
between economic left and right may still be an important determinant for
preferences towards solidarity, both interacting with (Kleider and Stoeckel
2018) and independently from (Alesina and La Ferarra 2005) actual economic
self-interest and status. While ideological positioning may be partially
endogenous to economic status, research has shown that it is possible to dis-
entangle the two eﬀects (Margalit 2013). Preferences for national social policy
are closely aligned to economic left-right ideology: beyond evaluations of
economic self-interest, individuals diﬀer in their views on fairness and equality
and on the role of the state in regulating the market. These beliefs inﬂuence
public support for national social policy (Jaeger 2006) and for international
redistribution. Kleider and Stoeckel (2018: 1) ﬁnd that ‘voters’ economic left-
right orientations are crucial for a fuller understanding of the public conﬂict
over transfers’.
On the other hand, the prospect of European social policy complicates
things because it touches upon the ‘boundaries of solidarity’ (Kuhn and
Kamm 2019): social policy is traditionally bound to the nation state, and
people disagree whether immigrants or citizens living abroad should also
beneﬁt from welfare policies (Pardos-Prado 2020). The literature on welfare
chauvinism shows that many citizens are generally supportive of the
welfare state but at the same time seek to exclude immigrants from its
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beneﬁts (Mewes and Mau 2013). Kuhn and Kamm (2019) ﬁnd in a survey
experiment in Spain and the Netherlands that economic left-right orientations
do not structure solidarity with unemployed people in other EU member
states. Hence, support for European unemployment beneﬁts might be more
closely linked to the emerging political divide on opening or closing national
borders against globalization (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Zürn and de Wilde
2016). Empirical research supports these expectations by showing that
support for European integration, European identity and cosmopolitan atti-
tudes more generally, signiﬁcantly impact on willingness to share resources
with people from other countries (Kuhn et al. 2018; Kuhn and Kamm 2019)
and international bailout support (Bechtel et al. 2014; Kleider and Stoeckel
2018; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018). In turn, Franchino and Segatti (2019) ﬁnd in
conjoint experiments conducted in Italy that both left-right ideology and
European identity inﬂuence support for a ﬁscal union.
These conﬂicting results reﬂect the multidimensional nature of European
social policy and underlying concepts of European solidarity. This multidimen-
sionality is salient in the case of unemployment insurance. Hence, existing
research on public support for European social policy in general cannot do
justice to the complex nature of labour market policies, especially those in
multilevel settings such as the EU. Given the multidimensionality of EUI, it is
important to study how citizens relate to these diﬀerent dimensions rather
than assessing their general support. Studies on international bailouts in
the EU (Bechtel et al. 2014) and labour market policies in Spain (Gallego
and Marx 2017) have shown that citizens are sensitive to changes in policy
dimensions. We consider six dimensions along which proposals for EUI
schemes may vary. Most of these dimensions have consequences both for
the domestic policies pursued within countries and for the relationships
between the participating countries. For instance, the level of generosity
has a potential domestic impact (it sets a minimum ﬂoor to the level of
national beneﬁts) and a supranational impact (it deﬁnes the overall volume
of support generated by the European scheme). Or, to take another
example, the conditions with which countries have to comply have a potential
impact on domestic education policies, but they also aﬀect the legitimacy of
the cross-border ‘insurance contract’ between the participating countries.
Notwithstanding this complexity, one can partition these dimensions into
‘(mainly) domestic’ and ‘(mainly) cross-border’ dimensions (Table 1). We con-
sider generosity, conditions and taxation as predominantly ‘domestic’ dimen-
sions, since they mainly resonate with well-known domestic policy debates. In
contrast, we consider between-country redistribution and the level of admin-
istration as ‘cross-border’ dimensions, since they refer to relationships
between countries. ‘Domestic’ does not imply that a policy is only understood
by respondents in terms of what it means in their own country. It means that
the respondent’s attitude is (expected to be) predominantly triggered by what
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they think about the intrinsic value of the policy (its beneﬁcial eﬀect) qua
domestic policy per se. A dimension is ‘cross-border’ if the respondent’s atti-
tude to this dimension is (expected to be) predominantly triggered by con-
siderations about relations between countries. Admittedly, the distinction is
not always clear-cut; in Table 1 we indicate that the conditions with respect
to training and activation which countries have to comply with can arguably
be classiﬁed as a ‘cross-border’ dimension rather than a ‘domestic’ dimension.
Table 1 provides an overview of this characterization of our dimensions and
states our expectations.
We expect that these two groups of dimensions interact diﬀerently with
economic ideology and support for European integration. Cross-border
dimensions speak directly to the latter. It is not only plausible that pro-Euro-
pean individuals are more supportive of between-country redistribution and
supranational governance than eurosceptics. It is moreover reasonable to
expect that the individual’s attitude towards the EU plays a greater role in
structuring the impact of these cross-border dimensions than economic
ideology.
H.1.1. Citizens’ orientations towards European integration inﬂuence the impact
of ‘cross-border’ dimensions of the policy design (between-country redistribu-
tion and level of administration) on their support for EUI more strongly than
does their position on the economic left-right dimension.
Table 1. Dimensions, levels and expectations of conjoint experiment.
Dimensions Levels Characterization Expectation
Generosity 40% Domestic
dimension
Economic left-right ideology
more important than EU
orientations
60%
70%
Country-level
conditionality
No conditions Domestic
dimension*
Economic left-right ideology
more important than EU
orientations
Education & training
Country-level
redistribution
No long-term redistribution Cross-border
dimension
EU orientations more
important than economic
left-right ideology
Long-term redistribution
between all countries
Long-term redistribution
from rich too poor
countries
Taxation No increase in taxation Domestic
dimension
Economic left-right ideology
more important than EU
orientations
0,5% for everyone
1% for the rich
Governance European governance Cross-border
dimension
EU orientations more
important than economic
left-right ideology
National governance
Individual
conditionality
No conditions Domestic
dimension
Economic left-right ideology
more important than EU
orientations
Accept any job
Accept any job & apply once
a week
* since this dimension involves a conditionality that is bestowed over the community, rather than the indi-
vidual, it can be equally argued that it constitutes a cross-border dimension.
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On the other hand, the ‘domestic’ dimensions tie into long-standing
conﬂicts over national redistribution and speak therefore directly to econ-
omic ideology. We therefore expect that preferences on domestic dimen-
sions are more inﬂuenced by economic ideology than by EU orientations.
Individuals with a left-wing economic ideology will value the domestic
redistributive character of the policy packages. Similarly, individuals with
right-wing economic attitudes will prefer less generous, more conditional
programmes.
H.1.2. Citizens’ positions on the economic left-right dimension inﬂuence the
impact of ‘domestic’ dimensions of the policy design (generosity, conditions
with respect to training, education and activation, and taxation) on their
support for the policy more strongly than respondents’ orientation towards
European integration.
Research design
The conjoint experiment
We conducted a conjoint experiment embedded in an online survey among
19,500 respondents in 13 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Poland, and Spain. These countries vary with respect to welfare state
models, past economic performance, geographical location, and euro zone
membership. Fieldwork was conducted by the survey company IPSOS and
took place in October and November 2018.
Conjoint analysis is increasingly used to analyse preferences on multidi-
mensional issues (Franchino and Segatti 2019; Gallego and Marx 2017;
Hobolt and Rodon 2020). In general, respondents are asked to choose
between diﬀerent proﬁles representing, for example, diﬀerent policy
packages. Each proﬁle varies across a series of dimensions, which can take
diﬀerent values.
Our conjoint analysis is introduced by a short information on the context
and aim of ensuring sustainable unemployment beneﬁts in countries facing
crises (appendix 1, Figure 1). The conjoint itself varies across 6 dimensions
(appendix 1, Table 1), which reﬂect to a large extent the ongoing debate on
actual policy proposals (Vandenbroucke et al. 2018). The diﬀerent levels of
these dimensions match conceivable policy variations and allow for the analy-
sis of fundamental political attitudes. Each respondent evaluates three pairs of
policy proposals by indicating which of the two proposals they prefer, and by
rating each proposal individually. Hence, they evaluate six proposals in total.
Both the selection (i.e., combination of dimensions) and order of the proposals
are completely randomized.1
The ﬁrst dimension concerns the percentage of the last wage of the unem-
ployed (or ‘replacement rate’) insured by the supranational scheme, and it
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features three levels (40%, 60%, 70%). This dimension hence captures the
generosity of the scheme. In some countries, values may include a lower
replacement rate than what is currently insured by domestic schemes. In
the framing, we clarify that countries would always be able to provide
higher beneﬁts if they so wish, but at their own expenses. In other words,
the scheme creates a common ﬂoor to the generosity of national beneﬁt
levels across participating countries.
The second dimension captures country-level conditionality, i.e.,
whether countries must fulﬁl some conditions to receive the funding. The
question is whether respondents prefer a simple beneﬁt scheme or
schemes that include social investment. The dimension is structured on two
levels (‘no conditions’, and ‘education and training’). The third dimension con-
cerns individual-level conditionality and captures preferences towards con-
ditionality with regard to activation policies, focusing on job-search eﬀort. This
dimension features three possible levels: ‘no conditions’, ‘accept any suitable
job oﬀer or lose the beneﬁt’, and ‘apply for at least one job per week, and
accept any suitable job oﬀer, or lose the beneﬁt’.
The fourth dimension refers to between-country redistribution. While
some schemes involve no long-term redistribution, others imply that some
countries become net beneﬁciaries from the scheme, while others become
net contributors. Three levels are included. In the ﬁrst level (‘insurance
option’), no redistribution is possible in the long run: the support that
countries can receive is capped by their long-term contribution. In the
second option (‘tolerant option’) all countries can receive more from the
scheme than what they paid in if necessary. Finally, in the third option (‘redis-
tributive option’), poor countries will in the long run be net beneﬁciaries of the
scheme (on purpose).
The ﬁfth dimension concerns the administration of the scheme: while all
schemes concern a European policy, the two levels capture whether national
administrations or an EU body implement the scheme. The last dimension
refers to the impact on taxation in the respondent’s country. Three levels
are possible: ‘no impact’; ‘taxes will increase for everyone by 0.5% of their
income’, and ‘taxes will increase by 1% of the income, only for the rich’.
In each country, a random sample of 1,500 individuals has been drawn.
Quotas for age, gender, education and regional distribution ensure that the
ﬁnal sample follows the population closely, with less than 2% discrepancy
for each demographic category in most countries, and no country with any
demographic distribution deviating from the population distribution more
than 4%. Surveys were translated into the main languages of each country.2
We restrict the sample to respondents who have passed an attention check
in the ﬁnal question of the survey, and to respondents who did not give
more than one set of inconsistent answer patterns in the conjoint exper-
iment.3 This yields an analytical sample of 93,612 observations.
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Operationalization
Dependent variables
The survey experiment includes two possible dependent variables (DVs): the
binary package choice, in which respondents have to indicate which of the two
packages they prefer, and the ordered scale package score, in which individ-
uals have to evaluate each package. We test our hypotheses with regard to
the score variables. To ensure that our estimates remain stable across model-
ling variations, we run robustness checks that alter (1) the sample composition
(including inconsistent and inattentive individuals), (2) the dependent vari-
able (package choice, package score), (3) the control variables, (4) the esti-
mation methods (OLS, Logit, Multilevel Mixed Eﬀects) and (5) the multilevel
embedding of the model (using individuals, countries and choice-pairings
as levels). Appendix 5e reports these robustness checks for model B1 (Full
Interaction Model).4
Independent variables
To measure economic left-right ideology, we construct a composite indicator
including 4 elements on the economic left-right divide: the opinion on gov-
ernment responsibility for the unemployed, on income redistribution, on
business regulation, and on the unemployed. These standardized items
scale just enough together (Cronbach alpha 0.53). Appendix 3b provides
question wording and robustness indicators.
To capture orientations towards European integration, we construct a scale
using 5 elements: European identiﬁcation, importance of well-being of other
Europeans, trust in the EU, trust in EU leaders, and support for membership.
These standardized items scale quite well (Cronbach alpha 0.77). Appendix
3b provides question wording and statistics on the indicator’s robustness.
Control variables
Our models account for gender, age and education (standardized by the 9
ISCED-11 categories), household income,5 and include a dummy variable for
being currently unemployed. We include country dummies in all speciﬁcations
to account for country-level variability.
Results
Split-sample approach
Appendix 4a shows a general assessment of the traction of each of the exper-
imental dimensions; however, a more detailed analysis of the experiment is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we ﬁrst test our hypotheses by split-
ting the sample in subsamples that cluster the respondents according to their
economic ideology and orientation towards European integration. We look at
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split samples to explore diﬀerences between groups in the causal eﬀect of the
EUI dimensions on preferences (Leeper et al. 2019). We partition the respon-
dents into two groups with opposite attitudes, and we apply a composite
scale to gauge economic ideology and orientation towards Europe, creating
in total four subsamples.6 Since we aim to capture signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
attitudes on the left/right and European scale, we restrict our analysis to
respondents whose score is larger than one standard deviation above/
below the mean.7
Testing our hypotheses in a split-sample approach involves three steps.
The ﬁrst step is to estimate, for each subsample, the impact of variations
across our six dimensions on the level of support for the policy. All models
(models 1–4 Table 2) use a simple OLS estimator in the score variable; they
include robust standard errors clustered at the individual level, and control
for age, gender, education, income and country. 8 Model 1 and 2 concern,
respectively, individuals with high and low scores on the composite left-
right scale, while models 3 and 4 focus on individuals with high and low
scores on the scale that measures orientation towards European integration.
Thus, we obtain coeﬃcients for the estimated impact of variations in the
policy. For instance, in model 1 (left-wing respondents), the coeﬃcient for a
generosity level of 60% is equal to 0.347, which means that, ceteris paribus,
the level of support for the policy among such respondents increases with
0.347 when the generosity shifts from 40% to 60%. In model 2 (respondents
not in favour of redistribution), the same coeﬃcient is only 0.082. Hence, there
is a substantial diﬀerence in the impact of such variation in generosity
between the respondents examined in model 1 and the respondents exam-
ined in model 2: this impact is clearly sensitive to their position on the left/
right scale.
Our second step is to measure the degree of sensitivity; we do this by cal-
culating the absolute diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients; in the case of a
shift in generosity from 40% to 60%, the absolute diﬀerence between the
coeﬃcients in models 1–2 is 0.265. The same calculation for models 3–4,
which are based on attitudes towards European integration, reveals an inter-
esting contrast. The diﬀerence in coeﬃcients between model 3 (pro-European
respondents) and model 4 (eurosceptics) is only 0.05: the impact of this
increase in generosity is not very sensitive to attitudes towards other
Europeans.
In a third step we systematically compare the degree of sensitivity, as
measured by absolute diﬀerences in coeﬃcients, between a clustering of
the population based on economic ideology, and a clustering of the popu-
lation based on orientation towards European integration. In the example
above, the absolute diﬀerence between models 1 and 2 (0.265) is much
larger than the absolute diﬀerence between models 3 and 4 (0.05). Put diﬀer-
ently, the impact of a shift in generosity from 40% to 60% is more sensitive to
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Table 2. Sensitivity to policy variation, tested via split-sample models.
Main models Hypothesis testing
model 1
left-wing
subgroup
model 2
right-wing
subgroup
model 3
pro-European
subgroup
model 4
anti-European
subgroup
C: abs.
diﬀerence 1–2
D. abs.
diﬀerence 3–4 hypothesis
Generosity (expectation:
domestic)
60% 0.347
(0.024)***
0.082
(0.022)**
0.281
(0.025)***
0.231
(0.023)***
0.2655 0,05 c > d
70% 0.514
(0.025)***
0.033
(0.023)
0.368
(0.027)***
0.286
(0.025)***
0,481 0.061 c > d
Country-level conditionality
(expectation: domestic)
Education &
training
0.152
(0.019)***
0.141
(0.018)***
0.187
(0.020)***
0.13
(0.018)***
0.011 0,057 c > d
Between-country redistribution
(expectation: cross-border)
Between all
countries
0.058
(0.023)**
−0.043
(0.022)**
0.094
(0.025)***
−0.035
(0.023)
0.101 0,129 d > c
From rich too
poor
0.102
(0.023)***
−0.043
(0.022)*
0.124
(0.025)***
−0.055
(0.022)**
0.145 0,179 d > c
Taxation (expectation: domestic) 0,5% for
everyone
−0.120 −0.190 −0.077 −0.155 0.070 0,078 c > d
(0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)***
1% for the rich 0.014
(0.023)
−0.210
(0.023)***
−0.056
(0.025)***
−0.064
(0.022)***
0,224 0,008 c > d
Governance (expectation: cross-
border)
National
governance
0.06
(0.019)***
0.07
(0.02)***
−0.126
(0.021)***
0.221
(0.020)***
0,01 0.347 d > c
Individual-level conditionality
(expectation: domestic)
Accept any job −0.126
(0.026)***
0.426
(0.024)***
0.196
(0.027)***
0.099
(0.025)***
0,552 0,097 c > d
Accept any job &
apply
−0.172
(0.026)***
0.450
(0.024)***
0.178
(0.027)***
0.084
(0.025)***
0,622 0,094 c > d
Coeﬃcients of control variables omitted
R2 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05
N 13,968 11,082 11,724 14,364
Notes: Figures are coeﬃcients of OLS models with individual-robust standard errors. SEs in parenthesis p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Models control for age, gender, education,
income and country. The last two columns measure the degree of sensitivity by the absolute value of the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients over subsample models; grey shade: hypothesis
conﬁrmed; no grey shade: hypothesis rejected.
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economic ideology than to orientations towards European integration, which
conﬁrms Hypothesis 1.2. Table 2 presents the results for all dimensions for all
subsamples. The seventh column of Table 2 indicates our expectations with
regard to the sensitivity of the impact of policy variation along the dimen-
sions. We expect that for generosity, country-level conditionality and individual
conditionality the sensitivity over model 1–2 is larger than the sensitivity over
model 3–4. We expect the opposite for between-country redistribution and gov-
ernance. A grey shade indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the
ﬁgures.
This analysis supports our hypotheses, except with regard to education and
training and a linear increase in taxation. The sensitivity to the education and
training condition is larger when we divide the population on the basis of a
pro/anti-European scale, than the sensitivity when we divide the population
on the basis of economic ideology. With regard to taxation, it turns out that
a distinction must be made between redistributive taxation (for which our
hypothesis H1.2 holds) and a linear increase in taxation for everybody: the
sensitivity to a linear increase (as compared to no change) is the same,
whether we divide the population in terms of economic ideology or in
terms of attitudes towards European integration.
Full interaction models and marginal eﬀects
Model 3 (Table 3) estimates a full-interaction model by including the inter-
actions of dimensions with the economic left-right scale and the EU-orien-
tations scale. This allows us to analyse how the intensity of diﬀerent forms
of polarization aﬀects the impact of the dimensions on preferences. Further-
more, a full interaction model allows to assess how preferences evolve when
we account for variations in both dimensions of polarization simultaneously;
both provide information that would remain out of reach when splitting the
sample. Again, all models are OLS with clustered standard errors at individual
level. Results are consistent across a number of robustness checks (appendix 5
and 6; for details, see footnote 1).
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents the main eﬀect, the second column the
interaction eﬀect with economic ideology, and the third column the inter-
action eﬀect with EU orientations. Similarly, the panels of Figure 1 reproduce
the predicted interaction eﬀects between the two scales and the policy
dimensions, for each of the levels of the scales (from −3 – right wing, and
anti-EU) to 3 (left wing, and pro-EU).
The results of model 3 align with the result of the split-sample analysis; the
direction and relative size of average eﬀects is equivalent. The analysis of the
marginal eﬀects yields additional insight on the interaction of cross-border
redistribution with the two scales (panels 5 and 6 in Figure 1). As the place-
ment of an individual approaches the extreme on both scales, the diﬀerence
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between the two eﬀects increases. However, this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant only
for individuals characterized by extreme attitudes, and only holds for prefer-
ences with regard to the ‘tolerant’ forms of redistribution. H1.1. is therefore
rejected with regard to the cross-country redistribution dimension, while it
Table 3. Full interaction models.
model 3: full interaction (scale)
main
eﬀect
interaction (left-
right scale)
interaction (EU
orientations scale)
Left-right scale 0.036
(1.70)*
EU polity scale 0.099
(5.22)***
Generosity 40% n/a (base level)
60% 0.217
(23.72)***
0.163
(10.78)***
0.014
(1.06)
70% 0.277
(28.69)***
0.261
(16.59)***
0.020
(1.4)
Country-level
conditionality
No conditions n/a (base level)
Education & training 0.155
(20.97)***
0.002
(0.18)
0.037
(3.45)***
Pure insurance n/a (base level)
Country-level
redistribution
All countries 0.019
(2.11)**
0.045
(3.10)***
0.059
(4.49)***
From rich to poor 0.024
(2.64)***
0.080
(5.51)***
0.069
(5.31)***
Taxation No taxation n/a (base level)
0,5% for everyone −0.136
(15.20)***
0.032
(2.23)**
0.026
(1.97)**
1% for the rich −0.067
(7.52)***
0.11
(7.47)***
0.006
(0.43)
Governance EU governance n/a (base level)
National Governance 0.058
(7.52)***
−0.006
(0.46)
−0.148
(12.65)***
Individual
conditionality
No conditions n/a (base level)
Accept any oﬀer 0.168
(16.96)***
−0.292
(18.02)***
0.079
(5.52)***
Accept any oﬀer & apply
once a week
0.144
(14.26)***
−0.336
(20.8)***
0.079
(5.44)***
Low education 0.054
(4.44)***
Logged household
income
−0.039
(3.93)***
Currently unemployed −0.045
(2.28)**
Age −0.010
(1.66)*
Female 0.010
(1.11)
Constant 3.273
(30.51)***
R2 0.07
N 78270
Notes: Figures are coeﬃcients of one OLS model with individual- robust standard errors. T-statistics in par-
entheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. First column shows main eﬀects, second and third column
show interaction eﬀects with scales. Coeﬃcients of country-ﬁxed eﬀects not shown.
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holds for the governance dimension. When redistribution is constrained to
take place from rich to poor countries, economic ideology plays as much a
role as EU attitudes. In fact, in this speciﬁc dimension, it is the combination
of the two scales that plays the most important role, with left-wing, pro-Eur-
opeans strongly supporting cross-country redistribution, and right-wing anti-
Europeans strongly opposing it. This suggests that while in general, prefer-
ences concerning some design elements are more inﬂuenced by economic
ideology, others are more inﬂuenced by attitudes towards integration,
genuine cross-country redistributive issues activate both sensibilities and
polarize individuals in yet a new way.
In sum, both the split-sample models and the full interaction models
conﬁrm our expectations on the relative eﬀect of economic ideology and
support for the EU on the impact of the policy dimensions on support, with
two exceptions: with regard to redistribution from rich to poor countries,
economic ideology plays as much a role as attitudes towards the EU; with
regard to the conditions for education and training policies, the position on
the EU polity cleavage is more important than the position on the left-right
scale.
Conclusion
Public opinion towards European unemployment risk sharing is poorly under-
stood. An original survey experiment ﬁlls this lacuna by exploring how respon-
dents’ economic ideology and orientations towards European integration
inﬂuence preferences for alternative designs of EUI.
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Figure 1.Marginal eﬀects for left-right scale in black. Marginal eﬀects for EU orientations
scale in light grey.
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We start from the idea that social policies in general, and EUI in particular,
are multidimensional constructs. Therefore, diﬀerent features of such schemes
may gather support of diﬀerent groups of people, depending on how a
speciﬁc policy design conforms or conﬂicts with the individuals’ political
orientations and how the scheme is expected to impact them personally.
To better understand the multidimensional nature of European social
policy, we deploy an original conjoint experiment modelling EUI across 6
dimensions. A total of 19,500 individuals across 13 countries were surveyed,
expressing their preferences for designs varying – on the one hand – on dom-
estic features of the schemes, such as the degree of generosity, country-level
conditions with regard to education and training, the taxation impact, and
individual conditions with regard to job search eﬀort; and – on the other
hand – on cross-border features of the schemes, such as the governance
and the presence of long-term redistributive eﬀects across countries.
We expect economic ideology (ranging from economic left to economic
right) to be more strongly associated with the domestic features while we
expect attitudes towards European integration to be more strongly associ-
ated with the cross-border features. Results conﬁrmmost of our expectations,
although in a more nuanced way than originally envisaged. On the one hand,
the economic left-right position plays a key role in determining the impact of
generosity, redistributive taxation, and individual conditionality for package
support; on the other hand, the individual’s attitudes towards European inte-
gration strongly moderates the traction that national governance versus EU
governance has on package support. One expectation is clearly rejected: the
country-level conditionality with regard to education, which was expected to
be more strongly associated with economic ideology, rather than with EU
orientations, turned out to be strongly moderated by EU attitudes instead.
This eﬀect may have two sources. First, citizens favouring European inte-
gration tend to have higher levels of education (Hakhverdian et al. 2013).
Hence, they may value education more, and be more sensitive to country-
level investment in education and training. Second, the country-level
nature of this conditionality may speak directly to the world view of pro-Euro-
pean individuals. In this understanding of what motivates our respondents, it
would be the ‘cross-border’ aspect of this dimension that speaks –in a posi-
tive sense – to pro-European individuals more than to other individuals.
Either way, EU orientations are far more important than economic left-right
placement in determining the impact of the country-level conditionality
with regard to education and training on package choice. Finally, our analysis
provides insuﬃcient evidence to support our hypothesis for country-level
redistribution. Although the average eﬀects are slightly larger for European
attitudes than for the economic variables, as expected, and although the
slope of the marginal eﬀects for the European scale is steeper than the
slope of the marginal eﬀects of the economic scale, the diﬀerence is not
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statistically signiﬁcant. The highest level of polarization over the cross-border
redistribution dimension is yielded by the combination of both scales: left-
wing pro-Europeans strongly support between-country redistribution, while
right-wing anti-Europeans strongly oppose it. This ﬁnding resonates with a
recent study by Franchino and Segatti (2019) that ﬁnds that high-income,
right-wing individuals with a weak European identity and negative assess-
ment of EU membership are most likely to oppose a European ﬁscal union.
It also speaks to the contribution by Hobolt and Rodon (2020) on EU issue
voting who ﬁnd that a candidate’s position on Brexit is as relevant to
voters as their economic left-right position.
Some limitations of this study invite caution in interpreting the results.
First, to maintain simplicity and avoid cognitive biases, policy variations
included here test only a sub-sample of the total policy variations possible
in a EUI scheme; there might be other policy packages (not tested in the
experiment) that gather even more support of those tested. Second, the
explained variance of most models is rather limited (r-square rarely over
8%), suggesting that some underlying phenomena (possibly macro-level)
are currently lacking in our analysis. The small number of countries (13)
limits the extent to which multilevel analysis can be used in this regard:
future work on this dataset will use the regional level to model the
macro-level conditions in which respondents are immerged. In this
context, the use of post-stratiﬁcation weights can be used to correct for
minor deviations in the sample from the targeted quotas. Finally, in practice,
the introduction of EUI would be a major development for the EU, tailored to
the perceived needs of the weaker countries. As such, it is unlikely that it
would be introduced without being part of a larger ‘grand bargain’, for
instance including tighter control on ﬁscal policy or strengthened macro-
economic coordination. Since such negotiating exchanges are impossible
to model within this experiment, it is possible that support for the scheme
in net-contributor countries is underestimated in our results, while support
for the scheme in net-recipient countries could be over-estimated. These
limitations notwithstanding, this article shows that diﬀerent patterns of
polarization can coexist in determining preferences for multilevel social
policy, and that diﬀerent dimensions of composite multilevel social policies
speak to diﬀerent sensibilities of individuals with regard to their economic
ideologies and their positioning on European integration.
Notes
1. The order of the dimensions was randomized, with the following exception:
country-level conditionality and country-level redistribution were presented fol-
lowing each other for ease of understanding.
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2. The Belgian survey was translated into French and Dutch; in the Spanish region
of Catalonia, it was oﬀered in Spanish and Catalan; Estonians could choose
between Estonian and Russian.
3. 12% of the respondents gave an inconsistent answer (the choice of policy A
over B, whilst the respondent expresses more absolute support for B) in one
of the three sets of policy alternatives; 2.6% gave more than one inconsistent
answer.
4. The baseline is a full interaction model (model 3) on the Score variable, exclud-
ing inattentive and inconsistent individuals, with controls. Appendix 5a includes
inattentive and inconsistent respondents; 5b excludes controls, and 5c controls
for fear of becoming unemployed, preference for migration controls, and con-
servative gender views. These variations are reproduced with the Choice vari-
able (appendix 5d, 5e, 5f). Model 3 is reproduced with 2 diﬀerent multilevel
embeddings (5g & 5h). Annex 6 reports model 3 for each country. The same
robustness checks for the split-sample models are available upon request.
5. Household income is log of the middle income of the decile to which the
respondent belongs (income after tax and compulsory deductions, from all
sources).
6. Appendix 4b shows additional analyses using single items rather than scales.
They largely align with the results shown here.
7. The scales being standardized, the mean is about 0 in both cases.
8. Appendix 4c report estimates using logit models instead of OLS (also for individ-
ual-variable models estimated in appendix 4b).
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